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Talks and Poster Presentations (with Proceedings-Entry):

G. Erdélyi, M. Lackner, A. Pfandler:
"Computational Aspects of Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates";
Talk: Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-13), Bellevue, Washington, USA; 07-14-2013 - 07-18-2013; in: "Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-13)", AAAI Press, (2013), 283 - 289.



English abstract:
Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting systems are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to single-peaked electorates, these systems suddenly become easy to manipulate. Recently, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra (2011b) studied the complexity of dishonest behavior in nearly single-eaked electorates. These are electorates that are not single-peaked but close to it according to some distance measure.

In this paper we introduce several new distance measures regarding single-peakedness. We prove that determining whether a given profile is nearly single-peaked is NP-complete in many cases. For one case we present a polynomial-time algorithm. Furthermore, we explore the relations between several notions of nearly singlepeakedness.


Related Projects:
Project Head Reinhard Pichler:
Effiziente, parametrisierte Algorithmen in Künstlicher Intelligenz und logischem Schließen


Created from the Publication Database of the Vienna University of Technology.